An apparent paradox proposed by Aharonov and Vaidman in which a single particle can be found with certainty in two (or more) boxes is analyzed. It is found that the paradox arises from a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule. The paradox is resolved by observing that the counterfactual usage of the rule is, in general, not valid. * rkastner@wam.umd.edu 1 In this case, the Hamiltonian H = 0; the ABL rule also applies to the more general case of nonzero Hamiltonian, with a time-dependence of the pre-and post-selection states in the usual way.
Background.
The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule is a well-known formula for calculating the probabilities of the possible outcomes of observables measured at an intermediate time t between pre-and post-selection measurements at times t 1 and t 2 , respectively [Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, 1964] . If an intermediate measurement of nondegenerate observable C with eigenvalues {c i } is performed at time t, the ABL rule states that the probability of outcome c j in the case of a preselection for the state |ψ 1 and a post-selection for the state |ψ 2 is given by: 1
It has recently been shown 2 that the ABL rule cannot be used in a counterfactual sense: i.e., in general, it cannot be used to calculate the probabilities of possible outcomes of observables that have not actually been measured at time t.
2. The three-box example.
In his 'Weak-Measurement Elements of Reality' (1996), Vaidman discusses an example of what he terms an "ideal-measurement element of reality of the pre-and post-selected system" ('ideal' in the sense of ideal measurements rather than weak measurements; cf. Vaidman (1996, p. 899) ). This consists of a single particle and three boxes labeled A, B, and C. The particle is pre-selected at time t 1 in the state
and post-selected at time t 2 > t 1 in the state
where the states |a , |b , and |c correspond to the particle being found in box A, B, or C, respectively. The pre-and post-selected states |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 are not orthogonal and can be viewed as eigenvectors of two 
where a ′ and b ′ are the eigenvalues corresponding to not finding the particle in boxes A and B, respectively.
The pre-and post-selected states |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 in the three-box basis.
With the above pre-and post-selection, the ABL rule (1) gives probability one for a measurement at time t (t 1 < t < t 2 ) of either of the observables A or B corresponding to opening box A or box B.
Analysis and resolution.
Vaidman interprets the above results as indicating that there are two 'elements of reality' for this system, corresponding to both the particle being in box A (if we look for it there) and the particle being in box B (if we look for it there). These 'elements of reality' are, indeed, highly peculiar and counterintuitive. But need we really accept them as 'elements of reality' ? I will argue in the negative: these results cannot be interpreted as applying to an individual system such as the particle in the above example.
For simplicity, let us assume that the experimental outcomes are statistically ideal-i.e., they match the quantum statistics perfectly (this is not at all a necessary assumption but simply makes for a clearer illustration of the argument). Since the intermediate observables A and B are incompatible, we have to choose which one to measure in any given run of the experiment. Consider first an experiment in which we start with 9 appropriately pre-selected systems and we choose to measure A (see Figure 2(a) ). Of those nine systems, three will be found in box A and six will not be found in box A. Subsequently, when we perform the post-selection measurement of O 2 , the distribution will be as follows: of the three systems found at time t in box A, one of those will be postselected in the state |ψ 2 . However, of the six particles that were not found in A, none of those systems will be post-selected in state |ψ 2 . Thus the actual process occurring in this experiment is one in which only one of the pre-selected particles will be post-selected; but that particle that is post-selected will be guaranteed to be one that was found in box A, because all the particles not found in box A cannot be post-selected for the desired state. The key point is this: in all these runs, any particle which might have been in box B at time t could not have been post-selected.
If we consider nine runs in which the observable B is measured at time t, we observe exactly the same statistics but with the roles of observables A and B interchanged ( Figure  2b) . In each case, the one particle out of nine which ends up post-selected is the one which could not have been in any box except the one which was opened (be it A or B). This means that it is not valid to say of any individual particle, "If in the intermediate time it was searched for in box A, it has to be found there with probability one, and if, instead, it was searched for in box B, it has to be found there too with probability one..." (Vaidman, 1996) .
The same argument applies to the generalized example of a particle in N + 1 boxes as discussed by Aharonov and Vaidman (1991) . Aharonov and Vaidman say of this example, "in spite of the fact that we have only one particle in the above situation, we find this particle with probability one in any one of the first N boxes" (1991, p. 2318) . However, as shown above, this statement is inaccurate in the sense that the property of being with certainty in any one of N boxes (depending on which one is opened) cannot apply to the same individual particle in any given run of the experiment. Thus these 'elements of reality,' as defined by Vaidman, are not really properties of individual systems but apply only to ensembles.
The error of attributing these peculiar properties to a single particle arises directly from the counterfactual reading of the ABL rule. In any given run of the experiment, we can measure only one of the two observables A and B. Once we have chosen one of these, say A, and applied the ABL rule to that situation, it is erroneous to then go back and apply a counterfactual reading of the ABL rule with respect to a measurement of observable B which has not occurred. I.e., we cannot say of any individual particle post-selected via an intervening measurement of A what would have been the outcome at t for that same particle, had we instead measured B.
